

Message Text

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FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2066
INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN
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AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 1258

FOR EUR/RPM

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: EEC, UK, CSCE, NATO
SUBJECT: EC-NINE PAPER ON SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN
TACTICS AT BELGRADE

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REF: LONDON 03620 (NOTAL)

1. AT A MARCH 7 MEETING WITH NON-EC-NINE ALLIED DELS,
UK POLAD DISTRIBUTED FOLLOWING EC-NINE PAPER ON SOVIET/EE
TACTICS AT BELGRADE WHICH WAS SUMMARIZED IN THE REFTEL.
2. IN THIS CONTEXT, UK REP ALSO REPORTED THAT THE NINE
STILL HAD REACHED NO AGREEMENT AMONG THEMSELVES REGARDING
PROCEDURES FOR THE REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION AT
BELGRADE. THUS, THEY WOULD NOT SPEAK WITH ONE

VOICE ON THIS SUBJECT AT THE MARCH 22-24 MEETING
OF NATO CSCE EXPERTS.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

1. THIS ASSESSMENT CONSIDERS FIRST THE GENERAL ATTITUDES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND EAST EUROPEAN STATES TOWARDS THE BELGRADE MEETINGS AND THEN THE WAY THEIR TACTICS MAY DEVELOP (A) AT THE PREPARATORY MEETING AND (B) AT THE MAIN MEETING.

2. ALTHOUGH THEIR ATTITUDE AND TACTICAL APPROACH WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCED BY DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN GENEVA, AND IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS IN PARTICULAR BETWEEN NOW AND SEPTEMBER, THE RUSSIANS ARE LIKELY TO VIEW THE BELGRADE MEETING WITH SCANT ENTHUSIASM. THEY ARE OF COURSE VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT IN WESTERN COUNTRIES PUBLIC OPINION WILL FOCUS CLOSELY, AT BELGRADE, ON THE REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF BASKET III, AS WELL AS PRINCIPLE VII IN BASKET I, WHERE THE SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RECORD IS PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO CRITICISM. THE RUSSIANS ALSO RECOGNISE THAT IF BELGRADE WERE TO BECOME THE SCENE OF A MAJOR EAST/WEST CONFRONTATION, THIS WOULD FURTHER INCREASE PUBLIC DISSILLUSIONMENT IN THE WEST WITH THE PROCESS OF DETENTE. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THE MAJOR SOVIET PREOCCUPATIONS ARE LIKELY TO BE:

A. THAT THE MAIN BELGRADE MEETING SHOULD BE SHORT AND AS UNPOLENICAL AS POSSIBLE, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE LENGTH OF THE PREPARATORY TALKS;

B. THAT THE AIM SHOULD BE TO OBTAIN A REAFFIRMATION BY
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THE 35 PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE LASTING VALUE OF DETENTE AS CONCEIVED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND OF RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS;

C. THAT THE REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION (INsofar AS IT IS NECESSARY) SHOULD BE CONDUCTED SO AS TO RESULT IN THE MINIMUM PUBLIC CRITICISM OF SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN INTERNAL PRACTICES;

D. THAT THE DISCIPLINE OF THE WARSAW PACT STATES SHOULD NOT BE IMPAIRED;

E. THAT EMPHASIS BE GIVEN TO THE "FORWARD LOOKING" ASPECTS OF CSCE: IN THIS CONTEXT THE RUSSIANS ARE LIKELY TO STRESS THE NEED FOR "POLITICAL DETENTE" TO BE COMPLEMENTED BY " MILITARY DETENTE", AND PAN-EUROPEAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL FIELDS.

EASTERN EUROPEAN ATTITUDES

3. THE ATTITUDES OF THE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTION OF ROMANIA WHICH WILL BE CONSIDERED SEPARATELY) ARE SIMILAR TO THE SOVIET IN MOST RESPECTS. SOME OF THE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES MAY SEE IN CSCE A VEHICLE FOR DEVELOPING DIRECT LINKS WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES (THOUGH WITHIN STRICT LIMITS AND WITHOUT SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO SOVIET HEGEMONY). SOME OF THEM CAN CLAIM A RATHER BETTER BASKET III RECORD THAN THE SOVIET UNION. BUT ALTHOUGH SUCH FACTORS MAY MAKE THE ATTITUDE OF INDIVIDUAL EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO THE BELGRADE EXERCISE SOMEWHAT LESS NEGATIVE THAN THAT

OF THE SOVIET UNION, THEIR SIGNIFICANCE SHOULD NOT BE EXAGGERATED:
THERE IS EVERY LIKELIHOOD AT BELGRADE, AS AT GENEVA AND HELSINKI,
THAT THE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (APART FROM ROMANIA) WILL CLOSELY
FOLLOW THE SOVIET LEAD, AS WAS DEMONSTRATED BY SOVIET INSISTENCE ON
A CLOSELY COORDINATED LINE AT THE WARSAW PACT PCC MEETING LAST NOVEMB
ER.

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DODE-00 H-01 NSC-05 CU-02 BIB-01 OIC-02 DHA-02 /085 W
-----082340Z 077914 /73

R 081415Z MAR 77
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2067
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FOR EUR/RPM

ROMANIA

4. THE ROMANIAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS CSCE FOLLOW-UP HAS HITHERTO BEEN
MORE FORTHCOMING THAN THAT OF ROMANIA'S WARSAW PACT ALLIES. ALTHOUGH
THE ROMANIANS' RECORD ON BASKET III HAS BEN PARTICULARLY BAD (AND
THEY HAVE RECENTLY TAKEN STEPS TO RECTIFY THIS ON A BILATERAL BASIS
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WITH SOME COUNTRIES), THEY SEE CSCE AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR PROJECTING
A DISTINCTIVE IMAGE AND CONDUCTING SELF-SEEKING POLICIES IN A WAY

WHICH WILL NOT THREATEN THE IMPORTANT BENEFITS THEY DERIVE FROM THE SOVIET UNION. (ROMANIA HAS IN FACT MOVED CLOSER TO THE SOVIET UNION SINCE THE GENEVA/HELSINKI NEGOTIATIONS THOUGH WHETHER OR NOT THIS WILL BE REFLECTED AT BELGRADE REMAINS TO BE SEEN). THE ROMANIANS DO NOT SHARE THE SOVIET WISH THAT THE MEETING SHOULD BE MADE AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE (THEY BELIEVE THREE MONTHS WOULD BE REALISTIC) AND THEY APPEAR TO ACCEPT THE NEED FOR A DETAILED REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION. THEY ARE PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO PROMOTE NEW WAYS OF DEVELOPING CSCE IN THE POST-BELGRADE PERIOD, AND ARE CONSIDERING TABLING PROPOSALS FOR THE HOLDING OF A NUMBER OF EXPERTS' MEETINGS.

BELGRADE MEETINGS: TACTICS THE PREPARATORY MEETING

5. THERE MAY BE LITTLE DIFFERENCE OF VIEW BETWEEN EAST AND WEST REGARDING THE ORGANISATION OF THE PREPARATORY MEETING. EASTERN STATES APPEAR TO SHARE THE VIEW OF MANY WESTERN STATES THAT THERE SHOULD BE A SINGLE COMMITTEE, MEETING IN CONFIDENTIAL SESSION, THOUGH WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF CREATING AD HOC DRAFTING GROUPS. THEY ALSO APPEAR TO ACCEPT THAT THE MEETING SHOULD BE TECHNICAL AND THAT ISSUES OF POLITICAL SUBSTANCE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED, ALTHOUGH IF THEY CHOOSE TO DISCUSS THE MODALITIES OF THE BREZHNEV PROPOSALS AT THIS STAGE, THEY MUST ACCEPT THAT THE PREPARATORY MEETING COULD BE PROTRACTED.

6. THE PREPARATORY MEETING WILL DECIDE THE DURATION, THE AGENDA AND ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES OF THE MAIN MEETING. SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN TACTICS MAY BE:

A. DURATION

SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIVES MAY START BY ARGUING FOR A VERY SHORT MAIN MEETING (EG TWO TO THREE WEEKS) BUT THEY MAY NOT HOLD OUT FOR THIS: THERE IS EVIDENCE AT LEAST FROM SOVIET MFA OFFICIALS THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE COMING TO ACCEPT THAT A LONGER CONFERENCE OF PERHAPS TWO MONTHS MAY BE UNAVOIDABLE. THERE IS ALSO THE FACT THAT ROMANIA IS KNOWN TO BE OPPOSED TO FIXING A CUT-OFF DATE.
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B. AGENDA

ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIANS MAY OPPOSE INCLUSION OF THE REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION AS A SEPARATE AGENDA ITEM, THEY MAY IN PRACTICE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO RESIST LIKELY PROPOSALS FOR AN AGENDA WHICH CLOSELY FOLLOWS THE TERMINOLOGY TO BE FOUND IN THE SECTION OF THE FINAL ACT DEALING WITH FOLLOW-UP. THIS DOES NOT CONSIST OF NUMERICALLY-SEPARATED AGENDA ITEMS, BUT IT IMPLIES A LOGICAL ORDER OF (1) REVIEW, (2) CONSIDERATION OF ANY NEW PROPOSALS, AND (3) THE ARRANGEMENT OF FURTHER CSCE MEETINGS. THEIR MAIN OBJECTIVE IN PRACTICE MAY BE TO LIMIT SO FAR AS POSSIBLE THE DURATION OF THE REVIEW ITEM, AND ALLOW MAXIMUM TIME FOR GENERAL DISCUSSION AND NEW PROPOSALS.

C. ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ROMANIA (WHICH HAD INDICATED CLEAR PREFERENCE FOR AN ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE SIMILAR TO THAT IN GENEVA OF A COORDINATING COMMITTEE AND WORKING COMMITTEES

TO COVER THE THREE BASKETS), THE EASTERN COUNTRIES HAVE SO FAR REVEALED LITTLE OF THEIR THINKING. IN STOCKHOLM, AMBASSADOR MENDELEVICH RECENTLY INDICATED THAT THE RUSSIANS COULD ACCEPT THE SWEDISH IDEA OF HAVING AN OPENING PLENARY SESSION FOLLOWED BY COMMITTEES TO DEAL WITH VARIOUS BASKETS. ALL OF THE EASTERN STATES ARE LIKELY TO PRESS FOR DETAILED DISCUSSION TO BE CARRIED OUT IN CONFIDENTIAL SESSION. IN THIS CASE THEY WILL NOT TOO GREATLY FEAR SOME POLEMICS ON INDIVIDUAL TOPICS (EG INFORMATION, CULTURAL EXCHANGES). THE RUSSIANS HAVE LET IT BE KNOWN THAT, IF PROVOKED, THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO GIVE AS GOOD AS THEY GET. THE ROMANIANS ENVISAGE A SYSTEM WHEREBY WORKING COMMISSION WILL REVIEW EACH SECTION OF THE FINAL ACT IN TURN, AND WILL CONSIDER ANY RELEVANT NEW PROPOSAL BEFORE PASSING ON TO THE NEXT SECTION. THEY ALSO ENVISAGE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COORDINATING COMMITTEE ON THE GENEVA MODEL.

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MAIN MEETING GENERAL

7. IF PUT UNDER PRESSURE BY THE WEST, OR EVEN TO PRE-EMPT CRITICISM, THE RUSSIANS AND EAST EUROPEANS WILL PROBABLY HAVE RECOURSE TO GENERAL SPEECHES WHICH POSTULATE THE HISTORICALLY DETERMINED FORWARD
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MARCH OF DETENTE AND CASTIGATE THOSE WHO ALLEGEDELY SEEK TO PREVENT THE PROCESS FROM BECOMING "IRREVERSIBLE". THEY WILL ALSO BE AT PAINS TO SHOW THAT IT IS THEY WHO ARE TAKING THE INITIATIVE IN CARRYING THE CSCE PROCESS FORWARD. THEY WILL COUNTER CRITICISM OF THEIR RECORD IN ALL FIELDS BY ACCUSATION OF INTERVENTION IN THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THEY WILL NONETHELESS WISH THE WEST TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE GENERAL NOTION THAT THE CURRENT POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IN EUROPE REMAINS CONDUCIVE TO FURTHER STEPS IN DETENTE.

8. DURING THE REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION, THE EASTERN COUNTRIES WILL PROBABLY CLAIM THAT THEY ARE PAYING EQUAL ATTENTION TO ALL THREE BASKETS. THEY WILL HOWEVER REMAIN HIGHLY SELECTIVE IN THEIR DISCUSSION OF THE PRINCIPLES; AND WILL LAY PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON BASKET II ISSUES, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY WISH THE BREZHNEV PROPOSALS TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT ITSELF, OR AS NEW PROPOSALS. WHILE THEY WILL PROBABLY NOT EXPECT EXTENSIVE ANALYSIS, THEY ARE LIKELY TO REFER TO THE PROPOSAL FOR AN EEC-CMEA AGREEMENT, REPRESENTING IT IAS AN EASTERN INITIATIVE. IN BASKET III, THEY WILL TRY TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM SOME AREAS OF PARTICULAR SENSITIVITY TO THEMSELVES (EG HUMAN CONTACTS) BY DWELLING ON OTHERS WHERE THEIR RECORD IS MORE EASILY DEFENSIBLE (EG CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES). THEY WILL SEEK TO PROMOTE AN UNPOLEMICAL ATMOSPHERE AND SO AVOID DETAILED DISCUSSION OF POINTS WHERE THEY ARE VULNERABLE (THOUGH THE ROMANIANS MIGHT BE MORE FLEXIBLE ON THIS LAST POINT THAN THEIR WARSAW PACT ALLIES). TACTICS IN THE VARIOUS BASKETS MAY BE:

BASKET I

9. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE EAST WILL WISH TO HAVE A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRINCIPLES (THE SEVENTH PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS COULD CLEARLY BE A SOURCE OF EMBARRASSMENT) BUT THEY WILL BE ARMED WITH MATERIAL TO COUNTER-ATTACK. MOST OF THE EASTERN COUNTRIES ARE LIKELY TO FAVOUR A VERY CURSORY DISCUSSION OF CBMS AND TO

AIM TO AVOID PROPOSALS TO CHANGE EXISTING PARAMETERS. THE ROMANIAN
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POSITION HERE IS HOWEVER VERY DISTINCT: THEY SEEM CERTAIN TO BRING FORWARD SOME NEW CBM PROPOSALS OF THEIR OWN.

10. WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES ARE LIKELY TO RAISE AT BELGRADE, IN THE DISARMAMENT CONTEXT, THE WARSAW PACT'S DRAFT TREATY ON THE NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NOFUN). OTHER PROPOSALS IN THIS FIELD WHICH MAY BE RAISED COULD INCLUDE THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A WORLD TREATY ON

THE NONE-USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (WOTONUF), OR A BAN ON INFLAMATORY PROPAGANDA INCITING TO WAR, OR A MORATORIUM ON THE EXPANSION OF MILITARY BLOCS OR A RESURRECTION OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT US AND SOVIET SHIPS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS BE EXCLUDED FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN.

BASKET II

11. THE EAST WILL PRESENT THEIR CASE BY STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION ON THE BASIS OF "EQUALITY". THEY WILL CRITICISE OUR CONCEPT OF RECIPROCITY. THE EAST WILL DOUBTLESS CONTINUE AT BELGRADE AS AT GENEVA AND HELSINKI TO INSIST ON MFN TREATMENT IN THE WEST AND AN END TO ALL "DISCRIMINATION". BUT WHILE THE EAST MAY PRESS FOR UNRESTRICTED ACCESS TO THEIR GOODS TO WESTERN COUNTRIES, THERE IS NOTHING TO SUGGEST THAT THEY WILL OFFER IMPROVED ACCESS FOR WESTERN PRODUCTS TO THEIR OWN MARKETS. WHILE THE HANDLING OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR PAN-EUROPEAN CONFERENCES ON THE ENVIRONMENT, TRANSPORT AND ENERGY WILL PARTLY DEPEND ON WHAT MAY BE AGREED AT THE PRIOR ECE PLENARY MEETING IN APRIL, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO MAKE THESE PROPOSALS THEIR CENTRAL BASKET II THEME. THE ROMANIANS, FOR THEIR PART, WILL DOUBTLESS BE PROMOTING THEIR CLAIM THAT ROMANIA BE TREATED AS A DEVELOPING COUNTRY.

BASKET III

12. THE EAST WILL PROBABLY CONCLUDE THAT THE BEST FORM OF DEFENCE IS ATTACK. THEY WILL WANT TO CONCENTRATE ON THE SECTIONS OF BASKET III

RELATING TO CULTURE, SCIENCE AND EDUCATION AND ARE LIKELY TO MAKE LIBERAL USE OF THE STATISTICS THEY HAVE BEEN ASSEMBLING (EG THE "CULTURAL IMBALANCE") TO TRY TO SHOW THAT THEIR RECORD IN IMPLEMENTATION IS CONFIDENTIAL

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STATISTICALLY SUPERIOR TO THE WESTERN RECORD. THEY MAY ALSO ATTEMPT TO COUNTER THE WESTERN CRITICISM OF THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD BY ATTACKING THE WEST FOR SIMILAR ALLEGED OFFENCES REFERRING TO SPECIFIC CASES CULLED FROM THE WESTERN PRESS; AND BY CLAIMING THAT CERTAIN IMPORTANT HUMAN RIGHTS SUCH AS "THE RIGHT TO WORK" ARE BETTER ASSURED IN THE EAST THAN IN THE WEST. THEY MAY MAKE SOME PLAY OF THE CLAIM THAT WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE MORE DILATORY THAN EASTERN IN GRANTING ENTRY VISAS. WHEN SUBJECTED TO HEAVY CRITICISM, EASTERN STATES MAY RESORT TO THE ARGUMENT THAT THEIR ACCUSERS ARE STIMULATING A POLENICAL

ATMOSPHERE OF A KIND WHICH MUST DAMAGE DETENTE AND THE "HELSINKI SPIRIT".

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DODE-00 H-01 NSC-05 CU-02 BIB-01 OIC-02 DHA-02 /085 W

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R 081415Z MAR 77

FM USMISSION NATO

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FOLLOW-UP TO BELGRADE

13. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DOES NOT CURRENTLY APPEAR TO FAVOUR ANY
FORM OF INSTITUTIONALISATION OF CSCE AND THE SOVIET ATTITUDE AT
BELGRADE

TO PROPOSALS FOR EXPERTS GROUPS (LIKELY TO BE MADE BY ROMANIA WAS WELLS
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AS NEUTRAL COUNTRIES AND POSSIBLY OTHERS) IS LIKELY TO BE CAUTIOUS.
SOVIET OFFICIALS HAVE INDICATED THAT THEIR DECISION ON WHETHER TO
AGREE TO A FURTHER BELGRADE-TYPE MEETING MAY DEPEND ON THEIR "EXPER-
IENCE" AT BELGRADE ITSELF. THE RUSSIANS AND THEIR OTHER WARSAW PACT
ALLIES MAY THUS, FOR TACTICAL REASONS, TAKE THE LINE AT BELGRADE THAT
THEY WILL ONLY AGREE TO A FURTHER REVIEW MEETING IF THE BELGRADE
MEETING AVOIDS POLEMICS AND REACHES A HARMONIOUS OUTCOME. BUT AS THE
SELFSTYLED INITIATORS OF THE CSCE, THEY WOULD NO DOUBT NOT WISH
BELGRADE TO MAK THE DEATH OF THE PROCESS. THE ROMANIANS ON THE OTHER
HAND ARE UNLIKELY TO CONCEAL THEIR PREFERENCE FOR PERIODIC BELGRADE-
TYPE MEETINGS WITH EXPERTS MEETINGS HELPING TO KEEP THE CSCE PROCESS
ALIVE IN THE INTERIM.

FINAL DOCUMENT

14. THE MAJOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN OBJECTIVE IS LIKELY TO BE TO
OBTAIN A FINAL DOCUMENT STRESSING WHAT THEY SEE AS THE PSOTIVE FEATURES

OF THE BELGRADE EXERCISE, EMPHASISING THE BENEFITS TO DATE OF DETENTE,

AND CONTAINING A CLEAR AND OPTIMISTIC REAFFIRMATION OF THE SUPPORT OF
THE PARTICIPATING STATES FOR THE DETENTE PROCESS (WITH THE LATTER
DEFINED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE IN SOVIET TERMS). THE RUSSIANS WILL WORK
HARD TO EXCLUDE ALL MENTION OF AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT, SUCH AS THOSE
LIKELY TO DEVELOP DURING THE REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION. THEY MAY WELL
COME TO BELGRADE ARMED WITH A DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR A FINAL DOCUMENT.
END TEXT. STAUSZ-HUPE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 30-Aug-1999 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 08-Mar-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977NATO01258
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: n/a
Format: TEL
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t197703110/baaabcei.tel
Line Count: 445
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Message ID: e19801b0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: LONDON 03620 (NOTAL)
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 13-Oct-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2962011
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: EC-NINE PAPER ON SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN TACTICS AT BELGRADE
TAGS: EEC, UK, CSCE, NATO
To: STATE INFO BERLIN MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/e19801b0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009